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Abstract
In this paper, we use the utility-based approach to decision making to
provide simple answers to the following three questions: Why under stress
positive reinforcement is more eﬀective? Why optimists study better?
Why people become restless?
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Why Under Stress Positive Reinforcement Is
More Eﬀective?

Phenomenon. To encourage a person to do something, we can use both positive reinforcement – when we reward a person for doing this, and negative
reinforcement – when we penalize a person for not doing the task. Both approaches have their strengths and limitations.
It has been observed that in stress situations, when a person’s mood is
negative, the relative strength of positive reinforcement increases; see, e.g., [11,
21]. Why?
Let us formulate this problem in precise terms. In traditional decision
theory, human preferences are described by utilities; see, e.g., see, e.g., [2, 3, 14,
17, 19]. A utility is deﬁned as follows: we select a very good situation A1 and a
very bad situation A0 and then compare each situation A with the lottery L(p)
in which:
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• we get A1 with probability p and
• we get A0 with the remaining probability 1 − p.
For small p, L(p) is close to A0 and is, thus, much worse than A: L(p) < A. For
p close to 1, L(p) is close to A1 and is, thus, mush better than A: A < L(p)
There is therefore a threshold value p0 such that:
• for p > p0 , we have A < L(p), while
• for p < p0 , we have l(p) < A.
This threshold value – for which A is (in this sense) equivalent to A(p0 ) – is
called the utility u(a) of the alternative A.
If p < p′ , then, of course, L(p′ ) is better than L(p). Thus, among several
alternatives, we should select a one for which the utility u(a) is the largest.
It is known that the utility of monetary rewards or losses is approximately
proportional to the square root of the amount m of money:
√
• u(m) = a+ · m for m ≥ 0 and
√
• u(m) = −a− · |m| for m < 0,
for some values a+ and a− ; see, e.g., [6, 12, 13].
We can measure the relative strength of positive and negative reinforcement
by comparing the changes in utility if we add or subtract a certain amount of
money m.
If we start with a neutral situation, in which we have no money, then the
original
√ utility value is 0. Then, after adding the amount m we get the utility
√
a+ · m, while after subtracting amount m, we lose the utility amount a− · m.
In this case, the ration of positive-to-negative reinforcement eﬀects is
√
a+ · m
a
√ = +.
(1)
a−
a− · m
What if we start with a stressful situation, in which the initial amount of
money is small but negative: −m0 < 0? In this case, the initial value
√ of the
√
utility is a− · m0 . After adding
m,
we
get
m−m
,
with
the
utility
a
·
m − m0 .
+
√
√0
Thus, the utility gain is a+ · m − m0 + a− · m0 .
If we subtract the money amount √
m, the we end up with the negative amount
−(m + m0 ), whose
utility
is
−a
·
m + m0 . Thus, the loss of utility is the
√
√−
diﬀerence a− · m + m0 − a− · m0 .
Thus, the ratio describing the relative strength of possible reinforcement
takes the form
√
√
a+ · m − m0 + a− · m0
√
(2)
√ .
a− · m + m0 − a− · m0
Our explanation. We will show that the ratio (2) is larger than the ratio
(1). This explains the empirical fact that under stress, positive reinforcement is
more eﬃcient.
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Indeed, for small x0 , by taking the ﬁrst two terms of the corresponding
Taylor series, we get
√
√
1
m − m0 = m − √ · m0 + o(m0 ).
2 m
√
For small m0 , we have m0 ≫ m0 , thus in the ifrst approximation, we can
ignore the terms proportional to m0 and only consider terms proportional to
√
m0 . So, the numerator of the ratio (2) takes the form
√
√
√
√
a + · m − x 0 + a − · m0 ≈ a + · m + a − · m0 .
Similarly, we have
√
√
1
m + m0 = m + √ · m0 + o(m0 )
2 m
and thus, in the ﬁrst approximation, the denominator of the formula (2) takes
the form
√
√
√
√
a− · m + m0 − a− · m0 ≈ a− · m − a− · m0 .
Thus. in the ﬁrst approximation, the ratio (2) has the form
√
√
a+ · m + a− · m0
√
√ .
a − · m − a − · m0

(3)

We can see that, in comparison to the ratio (1), we increased the numerator
and decreased the denominator – as a result, the ratio increases.
This is exactly what we wanted to explain.
Auxiliary analysis: beyond explanation. A natural question is: what if
instead of considering stress, we consider euphoria, i.e., we consider situations
in which we have a positive initial amount of money m0 . How will this aﬀect
the relative strength of positive and negative reinforcements?
√
In this case, we start with
√ the utility a+ · m0 . When we add the amount
m, we get the utility a+ · m + m0 , so the increase in utility is equal to
√
√
a+ · m + m0 − a+ · m0 .
√
Vice versa, if we take away the amount m, we get the new utility −a− · m − m0 ,
so the loss in utility is equal to
√
√
a− · m − m0 − a+ · m0 .
In this situation, the ratio describing the relative strength of positive and negative reinforcements takes the form
√
√
a+ · m + m0 − a+ · m0
√
(4)
√ .
a− · m − m0 − a+ · m0
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Similarly to the stress√
case, in the ﬁrst approximation, the numerator is approx√
imately equal √
to a+ · m − a+ · m0 , while the denominator is approximately
√
equal to a− · m − a+ · m0 . Thus, in the ﬁrst approximation, the ratio (4)
takes the form
√
√
a + · m − a + · m0
√
√ .
a− · m − a+ · m0
We can see that, in comparison to the ratio (1), we decreased the numerator
and increased the denominator – as a result, the ratio decreases.
Thus, we conclude that in happy situations, negative reinforcements are
more eﬃcient that the positive ones (but do not tell that to your bosses :-).
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Why Optimists Study Better?

Empirical fact. It is a known fact that optimists study better; see, e.g., [22]
and references therein.
Let us describe this situation in precise terms. What does optimism
mean in precise terms?
According to the traditional decision theory, if for each possible alternative
a, we know the probabilities pi (a) and utilities ui (a) of diﬀerent outcomes i,
def

then a rational person should select an alternative a for which the value u(a) =
∑
pi (a) · ui (a) is the largest [2, 3, 14, 17, 19]. In such situations, there is only
i

one rational choice, there is no possibility to show optimism or pessimism.
In practice, however, we rarely know the exact probability and the exact
utility of diﬀerent outcomes. Usually, we only know the bounds pi (a), pi (a),
ui (a), and ui (a) on possible values of pi (a) and ui (a): pi (a) ≤ pi (a) ≤ pi (a)
and ui (a) ≤ ui (a) ≤ ui (a). For diﬀerent values of pi (a) and ui (a) from the
corresponding intervals, we get diﬀerent values of the overall utility u(a). Thus,
instead of a single value u(a), we have an interval [u(a), u(a)] of possible values.
How should we make decisions if for each alternative a, we know such an interval
[u(a), u(a)]?
Reasonable requirements on rationality of a decision maker lead to the following solution (ﬁrst proposed by the future Nobel Prize winner Leo Hurwicz):
we should select a number α ∈ [0, 1] and select an alternative for which the
combination α · u(a) + (1 − α) · u(a) is the largest possible; see, e.g., [5, 10, 14].
When α = 1, this means that when making a decision, we only take into
account the most favorable situation, when the utility u(a) attains its largest
possible value u(a). This is clearly the case of extreme optimism.
When α = 0, this means that when making a decision, we only take into
account the least favorable situation, when the utility u(a) attains its smallest
possible value u(a). This is clearly the case of extreme pessimism.
Values α intermediate between 0 and 1 describe realistic decision makers.
The larger α, the more the decision maker takes into account the most optimistic
scenario and the less he/she takes into account the most pessimistic scenarios.
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Thus, the value α can serve as a quantitative measure of the decision maker’s
optimism: the larger α, the more optimistic the decision maker.
This explains why optimistic study better. In education, we invest some
eﬀorts now and get rewards in the future. Time for studying is taken from time
of having fun: we have less chances to go to a movie, to watch TV. etc. So,
in comparison with not studying, this part of the learning process brings less
positive utility.
We do study, because we know that there will be a future reward: better
knowledge, better job, etc. So, when deciding how much time we dedicate to
studying (or whether to study at all), we take into account both the utility
decrease now and the potential utility increase in the future.
The decrease now is clear, we thus know the value ud < 0. About the future
rewards, we are not 100% certain: now there is a demand for tour major, who
knows what will happen four years from now, when we graduate with a degree?
Thus, for future rewards, instead of the exact value ur , we only know the interval
of possible values ur ∈ [ur , ur ]. The overall utility therefore takes all possible
values form u = ud + ur to u = ud + ur . A person with an optimism value α
selects to study if the Hurwicz combination α · u + (1 − α) · u is larger than the
value 0 corresponding to not studying.
Here, as one can easily check, the Hurwicz combination is equal to
ud + α · ur + (1 − α) · ur = ud + ur + α · (ur − ur ).
This value increases with α. If this value was larger that 0 for some α, it will
be still larger than 0 for α′ > α – and for α′ > α, in some situations when the
Hurwicz value was negative, it may becomes positive.
Thus, the larger the level α of a person’s optimism, the more there are
situations in which this person will start studying. This explains why optimists
are better students.
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Why People Become Restless?

Phenomenon. When a person’s salary is increased, this person becomes happy.
If a few years pass and the salary remains the same, then, while objectively, the
person has the same good life as before, he or she becomes restless, unhappy.
Why?
The situation is the same as in the past years, so why is not level of happiness
the same?
Towards an explanation. It is known that our utility depends not only on
what we have now, it also depends on what we expect in the future: otherwise, we would act without thinking of possible consequences. The expected
future values of utility come with some discounting, usually, the exponential
discounting, when – just like when you invest money in a bank – the utility T moments in the future gets multiply by β T for some β < 1; see, e.g.,
[1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 20]. (For the bank, β is 1 minus interest; e.g., if the
5

interest rate is 3%, β = 0.97.) As a result, if ot is the utility caused by the
current situation at moment t, the actual utility ut at moment t is equal to
ut = ot + α · ot+1 + α2 · ot+2 + . . .
We do not know the future values, we get them by extrapolation, based on the
previous several values ot , ot−1 , . . .
The simplest possible extrapolation is linear extrapolation which is based on
the last two values ot and ot−1 . Here, ot+j = ot + j · (ot − ot−1 ). In the year t in
which a salary got increased, the diﬀerence is positive, so ot+1 > ot , ot+2 > ot ,
etc., hence
ut = ot + α · ot+1 + α2 · ot+2 + . . . > ot + α · ot + α2 · ot + . . . = ot · (1 + α + α2 + . . .).
A few years later, when ot = ot−1 , all extrapolated values are the same: ot+1 =
ot+2 = . . . = ot , thus
ut = ot + α · ot + α2 · ot + . . . = ot · (1 + α + α2 + . . .).
We see that the utility in the ﬁrst year is indeed larger than the utility a few
years after – this is exactly what we observe.
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